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Abstract—A well-designed attack in the power system can
cause an initial failure and then results in large-scale cascade fail-
ure. Several works have discussed power system attack through
false data injection, line-maintaining attack, and line-removing
attack. However, the existing methods need to continuously attack
the system for a long time, and, unfortunately, the performance
cannot be guaranteed if the system states vary. To overcome
this issue, we consider a new type of attack strategy called
combinational attack which masks a line-outage at one position
but misleads the control center on line outage at another position.
Therefore, the topology information in the control center is in-
terfered by our attack. We also offer a procedure of selecting the
vulnerable lines of its kind. The proposed method can effectively
and continuously deceive the control center in identifying the
actual position of line-outage. The system under attack will be
exposed to increasing risks as the attack continuously. Simulation
results validate the efficiency of the proposed attack strategy.
Index terms– Cyber-physical system, combinational at-
tacks, smart grid, power line outages, power flow.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power system plays an important role in supporting the
modern economy. Initial failures in power system, without
being promptly detected, may lead to large-scale cascade
failure, and have adverse affects on nation’s economy and
security [1]. Therefore, in the operation control center, various
data processing modules such as state estimation (SE) and bad
data detection are built to prevent the system operation from
failures and malicious attacks. Although many protection and
detection methods are used in system operation, these mecha-
nisms can be corrupted by injecting carefully predesigned data
to the measurements sent by Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA). The topic has attracted much attention
in the past few years [2]–[10].
In [2], the authors proposed the classic false data injection
(FDI) attacks that can avoid being detected by existing bad
data detection techniques if an attacker has the ability to alter
the measurements of sensors and capture sufficient knowledge
of the power system. Such FDI attacks are also known as
cyber attacks. The designed attacks should obey the physical
laws (Kirchhoff’s Current Law, KCL, and Kirchhoff’s Voltage
Law, KVL). The authors in [3] and [4] studied the classic FDI
attacks with incomplete information of the system, and [3] and
[4] revealed that the attacks have the ability of passing the SE
and bad data detection with only reduced network information.
Another type of attack called cyber-physical attacks involv-
ing cyber and physical levels have been investigated which
can more efficiently interfere the operation of the system
compared to classic FDI attack with only pure cyber attacks.
For example, there are two types of cyber-physical attacks,
which are line-removing attack and line-maintaining attack
as described in [5]. The line-maintaining attacks mean that
an attacker can let the target line be physically disconnected,
and simultaneously mask this outage event with the altered
measurements of sensors. The other advanced line-maintaining
attacks have been studied in [6]–[8]. Specifically, the authors
masked the outage event with local redistribution attack and
extended to attack with incomplete topology information [6],
[7]. The attack model was further derived with power flow
method [8].
The line-removing attack is that an attacker generates a fake
outage event so as to disturb the regular system operation.
The attack has to avoid the trivial solution; otherwise, it can
be easily detected by the control center. With this approach,
the attacker can mislead the control center with an incorrect
network topology and then make the system into unstable
situation due to wrong dispatches. The line-removing attacks
have been studied with partial and whole information of
the system, and mitigated with the countermeasure for the
proposed attack [9]. The authors of [10] focused on the line-
removing attack in the local area, and proposed the method
of finding the attack region. While implementing this attack,
one must notice that not all transmission lines in the power
system can be selected as attack targets because some lines
are strictly protected by the control center. Only few studies,
such as [5], considered the rules for selecting target lines.
Based on the discussions above, the previous approaches
have obtained promising results and demonstrated the potential
of the cyber-physical attacks. However, there is no guarantee
that the line-maintaining attacks are always unobservable. To
this end, the concept of the line-removing attack may be
applied simultaneously to fake an obvious outage in order to
attract the attention of control center, so that the disconnected
line has lower chance to be identified. Additionally, with this
approach, the longer the control center in figuring the problem
at fake outage positions, the more risky the system is.
Inspired by the above observations, we develop a novel
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Fig. 1: The system block diagram
attack strategy that combines the line-removing and line-
maintaining attack strategies. The attack is implemented in the
local area and cannot be detected easily because our design
makes sure that the physical laws of the power system are
satisfied. In addition, unlike previous studies which randomly
select the target lines, a rule of deciding the target lines is
proposed in this work. To this end, we employ the line outage
distribution factors (LODFs) as the impact of the attack line
selections. The contributions of this study are as follows:
• We propose a novel attack strategy called combinational
attack whose goal is to attack the transmission line and
simultaneously mask the real outage event with mislead-
ing the control center into another fake outage line.
• We design a selection rule based on LODF for selecting
the target lines instead of random selection.
• To mislead the control center, the corresponding power
flow must be dispatched according to the pattern of
target line and misleading line. Hence, we propose an
algorithm based on breadth-first search (BFS) [11], which
is generally used for searching graph structure.
• To test the effectiveness of the proposed attack strategy,
the conventional SE and bad data detection are applied.
The simulation results reveal that the misleading line can
be actually detected by control center and the real outage
event can be successfully hidden at the same time.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system considered in this study is shown in Fig. 1,
which is divided into two parts, including state estimator,
and cyber-physical attack model. In this section, we briefly
illustrate the state estimator based on the DC model, and then
the proposed attack strategy will be introduced in next section.
A. DC Power Flow Model
We consider a power transmission network with nb buses
and nbr lines, and let N and E respectively be the sets of
buses and lines. The power network can then be represented
as a graph denoted as G = {N , E}. Assuming a line l ∈ E
that connects bus i and j, and then the power of line flowing
from bus i to j denoted as Pl can be represented as
Pl =
θi − θj
xl
, (1)
where xl is the reactance of line l, and θi and θj are the phases
of bus i and j, respectively. With (1), the vector of all power
flows p = [P1 · · ·Pnbr ] ∈ Rnbr×1 and the phase angles of the
buses θ = [θ1 · · · θnb ] ∈ Rnb×1 should satisfy
p = Bfθ, (2)
where Bf ∈ Rnbr×nb is a matrix whose row indicates the
corresponding line, and the column presents the direction of
line’s flow. Therefore, the l-th row of Bf which represents
line l flowing from bus i to bus j can be formulated as
Bf{l,k} =

1
xl
, if k = i,
−1
xl
, if k = j,
0, others.
(3)
B. Linear State Estimation
Based on the DC power flow model, the system states are
phase angles, θ, and therefore the measurements received by
SCADA system without attack can be expressed as
z = H(Pe,G)θ + n. (4)
Here, z commonly comprises of the measurements of bus
injection power and line power flow, and then H is the
jacobian matrix which depends on the network topology G
and network parameter vector Pe ∈ Rnbr×1 representing the
parameter errors. n is the measurement errors. We further
denote the measurements modified by the attacker with z.
With the measurement expression, we adopt weighted least-
squares (WLS) SE to estimate the system state θ. The objec-
tive of the SE problem is to minimize the sum of the squares of
the weighted deviations of the estimated measurements from z.
The SE problem is then solved by the following optimization
problem with assumption of zero parameter errors
F1 :min
θ̂
(
z−H (Pe,G) θ̂
)T
R−1
(
z−H (Pe,G) θ̂
)
(5a)
s.t. Pe = 0, (5b)
where θ̂ is the estimated system state, Pe is the parameter
error vector, R is the measurement error covariance matrix.
C. Bad Data and Parameter Error Detection
After applying SE, we have to pass through the bad data
and parameter error detection to ensure there is no bad data or
parameter errors within the measurements. In this context, the
normalized residual and parameter error method is employed
for detection.
The measurement residual vector can be represented as
r = z−H (Pe,G) θ̂. (6)
If the Lagrangian multiplier method is applied in (5), λ is the
Lagrangian multiplier related to the parameter error. Given r
and λ, the normalized residual rN and normalized parameter
errors λN can be calculated. The normalized residuals are
linked to the corresponding measurements, and the normalized
parameter errors are related to the corresponding line’s param-
eter. References [12]–[14] provide further details. With the rN
and λN , the errors are regarded as Gaussian distribution, and
we choose the largest value among these two parameters. If
the chosen value is below the identification threshold, then
there is neither bad data nor parameter error existing. On the
other hand, the measurement or the parameter corresponding
to the chosen largest value will be identified as the error. The
part corresponding to the error will be removed, and SE and
bad data detection will be carried out again. Such procedure
is performed until there is no error.
III. ATTACK MODEL
In this section, the attacker block in Fig. 1 is illustrated.
In particular, the capabilities for the attacker and the selecting
limitations of target line are first explained. Then, the proce-
dure of launching the proposed attack is separated into three
parts for illustration which are selection of the line for attack
target and decoy, determination of cyber attack region, and
alteration of measurements.
A. Introduction of the Attack
We assume that the attacker has the following capabilities:
1) the attacker has knowledge about the topology G of the
entire system;
2) the attacker has the capability to observe the sub-
network of G and perform the power flow calculation
for the sub-network; and
3) the attacker has the capability to change the states of
the measurements in the sub-network rather than whole
network.
To launch an attack, the attackers are limited to finite sets of
target lines because of the following reasons:
1) the line that connects to a transformer, or in between
two generators cannot be physically attacked;
2) the real and fake outage events cannot take place next
to each other; otherwise, the true outage position can
be easily observed if the operator goes to repair the
misleading line;
3) the generator output cannot be modified;
4) the load of the buses in the attack region cannot be
modified to be negative. Moreover, the difference of the
states and measurements before and after the attack must
be controlled within a specified range; and
5) if the system is separated into two parts when a line is
being attacked, then this line cannot be selected.
B. Mathematical Formulation of Selecting Attack Target Line
To determine the lines for attack target and decoy, we
employ Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs) matrix,
denoted as L ∈ Rnbr×nbr , whose definition and calculation
can be found in [15]. The m-th row and n-th column of
L, lm,n, represents the ratio of n-th line’s power flow that
will inject on m-th line when n-th line is in outage. With
LODF matrix, we can define an influence factor denoted as
f ∈ Rnbr×1 whose l-th element can be represented as
fl =
((
L{:,l}
)T
sign(p)Pl
)
, (7)
where L{:,l} means the l-th column taken from L. The
parameter fl shows the amount of power flow increases for the
whole system, when the l-th line is disconnected. Therefore,
we can determine the target line to be in outage
lo = argmax
l
{fl|l = 1, · · · , nbr} . (8)
After determining the line to be disconnected, we have to
choose which line is used to mislead the control center. The
idea behind misleading is to let the control center find out
fake outage event in the system instead of real one so that the
control center is delayed the time of detecting the real outage
event and even making wrong operation or decision. The more
time the control center spends on identifying the location of
real outage line, the more risk the system suffers. Therefore,
for the choice of misleading, the residual lines should reach
their thermal limits as close as possible after the misleading
line is disconnected. In this context, the optimization problem
of selecting the line is given as
F2 : max
wl,∀l=1,··· ,nbr
∑
l∈E
P l
Pmaxl
(9a)
s.t. wl ∈ {0, 1}, (9b)
nbr∑
l
wl = 1, (9c)
p = p+ (wTp) ∗ (Lw). (9d)
Pmaxl and P l denote the thermal limit and the modified real
power of lth line, respectively. Equation (9a) is the objective
function that sums the ratio of the flow after outage to its
thermal limit for all lines. Constraints (9b) and (9c) are the
equations related to the selection vector, w = [w1 · · ·wnbr ] ∈
Rnbr×1. Then, the calculation of the power flow after outage
based on LODF matrix is shown in Equation (9d). Therefore,
the misleading line is determined as lm = { l | wl 6= 0, ∀l =
1, · · · , nbr}.
The selected outage line, lo, and the buses connected by
lo are assigned to set L. Meanwhile, the buses linked by the
misleading line, lm, are assigned to set M.
C. Attack Region
After selecting the target lines for physical outage and
misleading, we then need to determine the attack region. This
is due to the fact that attacks should not have the ability to alter
the measurements of all sensors. Therefore, we assume that the
attacks only have the limited capability that can observe and
alter the sub-network of G. To launch the combinational attack,
the attacker aims to maliciously change the measurements in
a sub-network of G denoted as G = {N , E}. The buses and
lines in the attack region are assigned to the set N and E
respectively. In the set N , we further separate it into two sets,
A and B. The boundary buses in G are assigned to the set B
and others are placed in A.
The key idea of finding the attack region is that we have to
find a new path to re-dispatch the flow to supply the load of
the buses in M, and obtain the good estimate for power flow
of lo and the states of the buses in L. The sub-network can
be obtained through BFS algorithm which is detailed later.
D. Measurements Modification
For the measurement modification, we formulate an opti-
mization problem taking two objectives into account. One is
to minimize the difference of measurements before and after
modification due to the attacker’s ability. These measurements
may contain the angles, the loads of buses, and the power flows
of the lines. However, the power flows of the lines are closely
related to the angles and loads of buses, and hence the first
objective can be defined as
J1 = ||p− p||2, (10)
where p is the power flow after modification in the attack
region. Another objective is to maximize the modified mea-
surements corresponding to the power flow at line lm which
flows from bus i to bus j, and can be defined as
J2 =
θi − θj
xl
∣∣∣∣
i,j∈M,l=lm
. (11)
That is, we try to prevent the amount of the flow at line lm
from being 0 so that it makes the attack noneffective.
We then formulate the optimization problem by considering
J1 and J2 as follows:
F3 : min
θ,P
D
,P
J1 − J2 (12a)
s.t. θi = θi, ∀i ∈ B, (12b)
(1− τ)θi ≤ θi ≤ (1 + τ)θi, ∀i ∈ A, (12c)
(1− τ)PDi ≤ P
D
i ≤ (1 + τ)PDi ,∀i ∈ N , (12d)
P
D
i =
∑
l∈E
P l +
∑
l∈E\E
Pl, ∀i ∈ N , (12e)
P l =
θi − θj
xl
, ∀i, j ∈ N ,∀l ∈ E , (12f)
− Pmaxl ≤ P l ≤ Pmaxl , ∀l ∈ E , (12g)
where θi and θi are the angle of bus i before and after
modification. τ indicates the modification range. Equation
(12b) is that the angles of the boundary buses should remain
the same, and Equation (12c) shows that the changes of the
buses’ angle in A should be controlled in a range. The load
difference of bus i inside the region before modification, PDi ,
and after modification, P
D
i , should be maintained in a range
shown in Equation (12d). Then, the power injected into the bus
should meet the load as listed in Equation (12e). The midified
power flow in the attack region, P l, is calculated by Equation
(12f). In the final, Equation (12g) shows that the flow of the
l-th line have to be managed under the thermal limits.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
With the description in Section III, we now explain the
implementation strategy of the proposed combinational attack.
The section is divided into two phases as shown in Fig. 2. The
first phase is focusing on finding the line for line-outage and
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Fig. 2: The implementation strategy of the proposed attack
misleading. Then, with the determined lines, the attack region
and the modification are illustrated in the second phase.
For the first phase, we use Equation (7) to determine the
line-outage position, and then the misleading line is selected
with Equation (9). After determining the target lines, we must
check if the selection fulfills the rules described in Section
III-A. The detailed steps are shown as follow:
Step 1: We wish to select the line with the greatest influence
to the system for its disconnection. Therefore, lo is selected
as the description in (8), and the buses linked by lo are
assigned to L. Use LODF to calculate the power flow after
l0 is disconnected.
Step 2: For the selection of the misleading, we apply
misleading line select algorithm (MSLA) listed in Algorithm
1. At the beginning of the algorithm, we construct a vector u.
Then, the exhaustive search is applied to calculate the objective
function of (9) which is then assigned to u. At the same time,
we have to avoid the line lo being selected. In the final, the
line with the largest value is selected to be lm.
Step 3: Once we obtain the lines, we have to check if the
lines are reasonable or following the rules described in Section
III-A. If not, we eliminate the lo from f or lm from u for the
unreasonable line, and then start from Step 1 again. Otherwise,
enter to the second phase.
Algorithm 1: Misleading Line Select Algorithm (MLSA)
Input: Power flow p, LODF matrix L
Output: misleading line lm
1 u = [u1 · · ·unbr ] ∈ Rnbr×1.
2 for l = 1 to nbr do
3 if l = lo then
4 ul = 0.
5 else
6 p = p+ Pl ∗ L{1:nbr,l}.
7 ul =
∑
l∈E\lo
P l
Pmaxl
.
8 lm = argmax
l
{ul|l = 1, · · · , nbr}.
In the second phase, the attack region and the modification
have to be determined based on the selected lines. The region
of the sub-network G is obtained by using BFS algorithm for
finding the shortest path to redispatch the power flow, and the
modification is based on the solution of the Problem F3. The
detailed steps are listed as follow:
Step 4: Assuming the flow of the lm is from bus i to bus
j. The trivial solution is that we just add and minus the flow
amount to bus i and j, respectively. However, it can be easily
recognized by the control center. To prevent from the trivial
solution, we just add the flow amount to the load of bus i, and
try to find another path to supply the load at bus j.
Step 5: Set the N and E in G as empty sets first. To find a
path to supply bus j, we then use the BFS algorithm described
in Algorithm 2 to find the shortest path for redispatching the
flow. The path obtained from Algorithm 2 is regarded as the
sub-network G. We further includes lo to N and the buses in
L to E as the attack region.
Step 6: With the attack region, we now solve the opti-
mization Problem F3. The formulation in (12) is a convex
optimization problem with linear constraints. There are many
existing algorithms and toolboxes dealing with convex opti-
mization problem; therefore, one of them is applied. If the
Problem F3 has no solution, which means the current attack
region cannot satisfy the constraints. Algorithm 2 is thus
applied again, and go back to solve Problem F3 again. With
the solutions, set z = z and replace the measurements of z in
G with the solution of Problem F3.
Algorithm 2: BFS algorithm for finding misleading line
Input: System topology G, bus j, sub-network G, line lo
Output: Sub-network G
1 Find a bus g which has a generator and is the nearest to
bus j.
2 Current system configuration is W = {N , E \ {E , lo}}.
3 g : starting bus. j : destination bus.
4 let the bus g be the progress bus and the level k = 0.
Rest buses are set as unvisited buses.
5 Search all of the unvisited buses connected to the buses
in progress buses. Put such unvisited buses to progress
buses and previous progress buses are assigned as
visited buses.
6 if j ∈ progress bus then
7 go to step 11 of Algorithm 2.
8 else
9 repeat step 5 of Algorithm 2 again.
10 k = k + 1.
11 Backtrack from the destination bus to the starting bus
level-by-Ievel, and identify the shortest path. The buses
and lines in the path are given to N and E respectively.
V. CASE STUDY
In this section, we adopt the IEEE 14-bus system [16] to
illustrate the proposed attacking mechanism in detail. The
system topology is shown in Fig. 3, and the thermal limit
of each line is listed in Table I. Without any specification,
the modification rage, τ , for all measurements is set to
50%. The errors for all measurements are assumed to be
ni ∼ N(0, 0.001). The identification threshold of bad data
and parameter error detection is set to 2 which is outside of
95% confidence interval. The software toolbox, MATPOWER
[17], is utilized to run the power flow to provide the initial
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TABLE I: The thermal flow limit of IEEE 14-bus system
Line limit Line limit Line limit Line limit
number (MW) number (MW) number (MW) number (MW)
1 200 6 50 11 50 16 20
2 100 7 100 12 20 17 20
3 100 8 50 13 50 18 20
4 100 9 100 14 50 19 20
5 100 10 100 15 50 20 20
information of the system. To solve the Problem F3, we use
CVX [18], a package intended to solve convex programs.
In the beginning, we select the target line based on the
Step 1 to Step 3 in Section IV. Line 3 is first selected for line
outage and line 10 is the line for misleading. However, the line
3 connects two generators, and there is a transformer on line
10; hence, we have to choose the target lines again. Following
the proposed recursive way, the line 13 and 17 are finally
selected as the line for outage and misleading respectively.
The direction of the misleading line is from bus 9 to bus 14
so that we have to find the path to supply the load of bus 14.
Moreover, the nearest generator is at bus 6. Therefore, we now
use the Algorithm 2 to find the shortest path from the starting
bus, bus 6, to the destination bus, bus 14. Table II summarizes
the attack region based on the results of Algorithm 2. Then,
the measurements before and after modification based on the
results of Problem F3 are listed in Table III and IV.
With the modified measurements, we perform SE and then
bad data and parameter error detection. The equation of the
power flow is linear, the solution of SE can be easily obtained
as
θ̂ =
(
BTfR
−1Bf
)−1
BTfR
−1z. (13)
TABLE II: The description of the sets used in the modification
Set Bus number Description
A 12, 13, 14 The buses in the attack region
B 6 The boundary bus of the attack region
L 6, 13 The buses connecting the line-outage line
M 9, 14 The buses connecting the misleading line
Set Line number Description
E 12, 13, 19, 20 The lines in the attack region
TABLE III: The phase and load before and after modification
Bus number Phase (angle) Load (MW)
Before After Before After
6 −0.1378 −0.1378 11.20 9.21
9 −0.1615 −0.1615 29.50 37.89
12 −0.1582 −0.1592 6.10 6.20
13 −0.1616 −0.1635 13.50 12.13
14 −0.1842 −0.1975 14.90 9.76
TABLE IV: The power flow before and after modification
Line number Power flow (MW)
Before After
12 7.88 8.36
13 18.22 19.36
17 8.39 0
19 1.78 2.16
20 6.51 9.76
Hence, we apply the detection by calculating the normalized
residual and parameter errors, and sort the results shown in
Table V(a) in a descending order. From the table, there are two
largest parameter errors related to x17 and x20 and they are
also larger than the identification threshold. We then eliminate
the measurements having relation with x17 and x20, and apply
the bad data detection again. Table V(b) shows the results of
the second-round detection. The largest value in Table V(b)
is much lower than the threshold. Therefore, according to the
results, we successfully let the control center find out there is
an error happening in the misleading line.
The bad data and parameter error detection can be influ-
enced by the noise, we further collect the results with 1, 000
Monte Carlo simulations. If the parameter of misleading line
is recognized as the error, and the corresponding parameter
error is larger than the threshold, the attack is regarded as
a successful attack. Furthermore, the false alarm is defined
as other parameter or measurement are regarded as the error.
According to the results, the successful rate calculated by
the ratio of the number of the successful attacks to 1, 000
is 79.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0%. That is, the error of
the parameter at misleading line shows up at every simulation.
However, the normalized parameter errors are sometimes not
larger than the threshold with noise’s influence. Therefore, we
can ensure the efficiency of the proposed attack strategy.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present the combinational attack which
maliciously injects the false data in the cyber layer to cover
TABLE V: The bad data and parameter error detection results
(a) First Round (b) Second Round
Parameter
λNi , r
N
i
Parameter
λNi , r
N
iMeasurement Measurement
x17, x20 3.0126 x3, x6 0.0531
x13 1.4691 x5 0.0339
x11, x16, x18 1.3031 x7 0.0259
x10 1.0580 x9 0.0182
the physical event in the power system. While launching the
attack, the method of finding the target lines is introduced
based on the LODF matrix. Moreover, an algorithm followed
by BFS algorithm was proposed to find the attack region, and
the modification results are from the power flow equations.
The simulation results also reveal that the proposed scheme
can successfully achieve the goal of misleading the control
center and mask the line-outage event. As the future work,
we will extend this study in two directions by proposing
the attack based on AC power flow, and investigating a
protection strategy for the cyber-physical system. Moreover,
the assessment of the power system with the proposed attack
method should also be discussed.
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